

# WHO CAPTURES THE CASH?

**How EU farming subsidies support the elites at the expense of everyone else**

Europe's farming faces an intertwined social and environmental crisis. Farmers, mostly small and medium-scale producers<sup>1</sup>, are subject to economic pressures [forcing them to either go big or go bust](#). They report facing [ever-increasing input costs, to the benefit of fertilisers and pesticides multinationals](#), as well as the stronger bargaining power of large retailers, food companies and other food chain actors, driving down the prices farmers receive for their products. At the same time, they are exposed to the growing impacts of climate and ecological breakdown. According to the European Environment Agency, [Europe is the fastest-warming continent](#), increasingly ravaged by unprecedented heat waves, droughts, wildfires and floods. These shocks add to long-standing environmental pressures - ranging from air, soil, and water pollution to biodiversity loss - which undermine food production and rural livelihoods.

The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) should be a lifeline for farmers and nature in this landscape of growing challenges. The EU's flagship farm policy, a subsidy system [accounting for roughly a third of the EU budget](#), was created to stabilise farm incomes, support rural communities, and ensure Europe's food supply. While the CAP has played a role in strengthening farmers' incomes, it has disproportionately benefited large farmers and landowners, fuelling the growth of an industrial farming model at the expense of nature, climate and small and medium-scale food producers. Between 2007 and 2022, the EU [lost almost two million commercial small-scale farms](#)<sup>2</sup>, a decrease of 44%. Most of these have closed or, to a much lesser extent, scaled up to industrial levels of production. Meanwhile, the number of mega-farms has grown by more than half (56%). The number of non-commercial subsistence farms plummeted even more between 2005 and 2020, with roughly 4.6 million farms lost.

This briefing, commissioned by Greenpeace European Unit, examines the distribution of CAP payments in Czechia, Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain for the year 2024. For each country, we look at the distribution of subsidies, and in a series of case studies highlight some of the biggest recipients of CAP money - most often receiving public funds in the form of area-based direct payments. These cases illustrate the lack of social legitimacy underpinning the current EU farm policy.

Our analysis shows that taxpayers are footing the bill for a system where a very small number of recipients take the lion's share of the public subsidies, and that public funds predominantly support some of the wealthiest individuals and companies in Europe, some of which have even been found in breach

of social and environmental laws, as evidenced below. Instead of being spent on the delivery of public goods - such as ensuring healthy ecosystems, securing clean air and water, protecting soils and animal welfare, and providing fair living conditions to farmers and vibrant rural communities - public money ends up enriching wealthy landowners, industrial farms and corporations investing in farmland ownership.

This is a consequence of how CAP subsidies are structured, with the majority of funding distributed in the form of area-based payments - meaning the more land a producer controls, the more subsidies it receives. These payments have minimal environmental or social conditions attached, disproportionately benefiting the largest landowners at the expense of nature and millions of struggling farmers. Thus, CAP subsidies are fuelling not only ecological breakdown but also inequality.

These crucial flaws in farm subsidy distribution have been exacerbated by recent legislative changes to the basic CAP regulation. Two consecutive CAP 'simplification' reforms, the first adopted in May 2024 and the second just agreed in triologue negotiations at the time of writing, have massively undermined the green architecture of the CAP, substantially weakening many environmental requirements for CAP beneficiaries while eliminating others. Cutting the essential environmental requirements that underpin the CAP's 'green architecture' makes the hectare-based delivery model of CAP money even more unfair, and calls for an urgent and substantial reform of the policy.

This analysis comes in the wake of several recent scandals concerning the CAP, including [investigations](#) unveiling alleged payments to farms convicted of exploiting migrant workers as well as shocking [cases of farm subsidies frauds erupting across Europe](#), which fundamentally challenge the legitimacy of CAP funding distribution.

With the start of the political debate on the next CAP reform, the EU once again has the chance to turn the tide and adapt its farm policy to contemporary realities: ensuring that public money truly serves farmers in need as well as the planet. Instead of supporting wealthy landowners, the further industrialisation of the farming sector and mega-farms, the EU should distribute subsidies in a fair and just manner, supporting farmers facing economic precarity, young farmers and farmers willing to transition to agroecological production methods or helping those that already transitioned to remain sustainable.

Greenpeace is not alone in calling for this shift. This was also the unanimous conclusion of all 29 food chain actors that participated in the [Strategic Dialogue on the Future of Agriculture](#), a platform created by the European Commission that brought together farmers unions, actors from European agri-food sectors, civil society, rural communities and academia to reach a common vision for the future of EU's farming and food systems.

1. We define small farms as any commercial farms with a yearly standard economic output below €49,999. Medium producers have a yearly standard economic output ranging from €50,000 to €249,999.

2. Farms large enough to provide the farmers' main employment and a sufficient income to support their families

# CONCENTRATION OF FARMING SUBSIDIES IN THE HANDS OF A FEW

The concentration of farming subsidies is well documented. Our analysis not only confirms the oft-quoted statistic that 80% of CAP subsidies are concentrated in the hands of 20% of beneficiaries across Europe, but also reveals staggering figures of concentration across smaller segments of beneficiaries - the top 1% and 10% - in the six countries assessed.<sup>3</sup> Overall, we found that a small fraction of recipients is siphoning off disproportionately large chunks of public resources:

3. It is worth noting that the "80%/20%" figure concerns only direct payments, while our analysis covers all types of support (including national co-financing). It is unsurprising, however, to observe consistency as direct payments represent the largest share of support (roughly two-thirds of CAP expenditures).

## The top 1% of beneficiaries

**get up to 40% of farming subsidies.**

In Spain and Italy the top 1% beneficiaries get around 30% of subsidies while in the Netherlands they collect a staggering 40%.

## The top 10% of beneficiaries

**get on average two-thirds of overall farming subsidies.**


The top 10% of beneficiaries in all countries investigated get between 59% and 69% of the subsidies.


## The top 20% of beneficiaries

**are getting roughly four-fifths of farming subsidies.**

In all six countries, the top 20% of beneficiaries get between 71% (Netherlands) and 83% (Czechia) of CAP subsidies.

## AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION OF CAP PAYMENTS AMONG THE TOP 1%/10%/20% BENEFICIARIES ACROSS THE 6 COUNTRIES STUDIED





**Large chunks of taxpayers' contributions support, by rewarding land ownership, individuals and corporations that are exceptionally wealthy compared to the majority of European farmers and citizens, some featuring among the richest people in Europe. Many of these beneficiaries own vast stretches of land and operate across multiple countries, while some run businesses where farming is just one source of revenue among many others.**

Beyond observing concentration in CAP payments, we combed through the datasets of the six countries assessed to find out *who* are the top beneficiaries of CAP support - the top 1%. As part of this qualitative analysis, we also dived specifically into the top 100 beneficiaries of direct payments (measure I.1; Basic Income Support for Sustainability), which form the majority of farming subsidies and have become one of the CAP's most controversial and damaging tools. These rankings are based on public data sourced from the countries' respective national [databases on EU agricultural support](#). It is worth noting, however, that the picture these rankings provide is far from complete as large groups with several subsidiaries may not appear among the top 1% of beneficiaries or among the top 100 recipients of direct payments, because their subsidiaries receive support that is not shown collectively under the parent company. In this way, major beneficiaries can slip under the radar.

As for the case studies, they were deliberately chosen at national level to showcase some of the most striking beneficiaries epitomising the system's flaws: subsidies flowing to some of the wealthiest and most influential actors within and outside of the EU farming sector just because they own land or were able to invest in land ownership. These

anecdotal findings confirm previous empirical research which concluded that direct payments have [deepened income inequality in agriculture](#) and [made land less accessible for new, young and less resourced entrants into farming](#). Also when expanding the analysis to subsidies other than direct payments we found very wealthy non-farming elites receiving substantial CAP support. Even more disturbingly, a number of these top CAP funding recipients have been linked to breaches of environmental and animal welfare regulations<sup>4</sup>.

There are so many better ways for these subsidies to be spent. This briefing includes cases where wealthy landowners received anywhere between from €195,000 to €16.6 million a year. At the lower end of this scale, if we apply [average costs derived from published evidence and compiled by the Institute for European Environmental Policy](#)<sup>5</sup>, €195,000 could support between 112 and 415 European small farms (of 5 hectares) using cover crops for a year. At the upper end, €16.6 million could help between 1,328 and 7,703 small farms reduce water consumption.<sup>6</sup>

4. Greenpeace EU Unit has provided to all the entities mentioned in the case studies, the opportunity to comment. At the time of publication it has received responses only by two of them and amended the text accordingly.

5. Average cost estimates compiled by the Institute for European Environmental Policy are based on evidence reported in the literature.

6. The costs vary from €94-€347 per hectare per year for cover crops, and €431-€2500 per hectare for reducing water consumption. These estimates are drawn from studies conducted in very different contexts and should be understood as indicative rather than absolute, with costs varying significantly depending on factors such as the choice of equipment, local seed prices, farmer experience, etc.



Germany



Legal  
recipient's  
entity name:

**ALG Aschara Landwirtschafts-  
gesellschaft mbH**



**706,377**

of which €673,579  
received in the form  
of direct payments

**#24**

**in top 100 recipients  
of direct payment  
in Germany**

ALG Aschara Landwirtschaftsgesellschaft mbH is among the top 30 recipients of CAP direct payments in Germany, and is a [subsidiary of the ADIB Agrargesellschaft](#). The latter was [sold to the Lukas Foundation](#), belonging to one of the wealthiest families in Germany: the heirs of the Aldi Nord dynasty, the Albrecht family, which invests part of their assets in agricultural land through a foundation.

This is just the tip of the iceberg: Aldi heirs own numerous agricultural businesses in Germany. These are reportedly part of a complex holding structure. As it is not clear how many agricultural businesses are owned by the Aldi Nord Group (e.g. via the Lukas Foundation), it is not possible to determine reliable figures for the total subsidy payments received - and ALG Aschara Landwirtschaftsgesellschaft mbH is one of many other examples. However, it has been reported that the Aldi heirs own [9,000 hectares in Germany](#) and receive between [three](#) and [six](#) million euros annually.



Netherlands



Legal  
recipient's  
entity name:

**HANDELSHUIS  
SCHUTTERT**



**195,154**

of which €142,196  
received in the form  
of direct payments

**#12**

**in top 100 recipients  
of direct payment  
in the Netherlands**

According to [Follow the Money](#), despite receiving subsidies meant for environmentally friendly practices, Schutttert has reportedly a history of violating environmental regulations. He has reportedly [expanded farms without the necessary permits](#) and allegedly [failed to consistently ensure the equipment designed to lower the stables' ammonia emissions worked adequately](#). This is particularly scandalous in the Netherlands, which has been battling a nitrogen crisis for years. [His plan to build a factory farm for 14,000](#) breeding pigs near Beerzerveld met with fierce opposition from local residents and animal welfare organizations - to the point that it was [eventually abandoned](#).



Denmark



Legal  
recipient's  
entity name:

**K/S Bregentved**

Amount of CAP subsidies in 2024 :



**1,062,754**

of which €958,679  
received in the form  
of direct payments

**#2**

**in top 100 recipients  
of direct payment  
in Denmark**

commercial activities are extensive and varied, including renting houses, leasing hunting areas, and operating industrial facilities, such as the Erhvervspark Vandel. The group is also involved in industrial-scale pig production of [130.000 slaughter pigs, and 80.000 piglets](#).

In 2016, Bregentved became a symbol of public subsidy abuse when it was [caught exploiting a loophole to circumvent a subsidy cap](#) to obtain funding to build four huge pig barns. The Moltke family created four separate companies - one for each barn - allowing them to claim the maximum grant four times, totaling [28 million DKK](#) (roughly €3.75 million euros). Danish authorities initially approved this maneuver but years later, under EU pressure and audit criticism, the scheme was deemed a case of "artificial conditions... to get more EU support" and [ruled unlawful](#) by the Danish Agricultural Agency. In July 2024, the Agriculture Agency ordered Bregentved to [repay](#) 26.7 million DKK (roughly €3.6 million euros) of improperly obtained funds. Bregentved's owners - Count Christian and his son Count Frederik Moltke - were pinpointed as prime beneficiaries of this accounting trick that funneled them tens of millions in extra aid. Bregentved has later [sued the Agency](#) to avoid paying back the funds.

For over 275 years, the Bregentved estate has remained in the [continuous ownership of the noble Moltke family](#). Today, [Bregentved](#) operates as a diversified conglomerate under the umbrella of the «Bregentved Gruppen.» Its landholdings are extremely large, [covering 6,500 hectares of agricultural land and forests](#). While agriculture and forestry form the core of its operations, the group's



Spain



Legal  
recipient's  
entity name:

**Eurotécnica Agraria SA**

**(Eurotécnica Agraria is one of the companies owned by the aristocratic House of Alba family.)**

Amount of CAP subsidies in 2024:



**278,328**

(of which €194.423 received in the form of direct payments)

**#74**

**in top 100 recipients of direct payments in Spain**

The heirs of the Duchess of Alba divide among themselves the titles and the assets of the 'aristocrat among aristocrats', who came to [accumulate more noble titles than anyone else in Spain](#). They reportedly own [14,704 hectares of land](#).

In 2025, the House of Alba, and its Aljíoabar estate (which benefits from subsidies through the entity Eurotécnica Agraria), was investigated for having illegally extracted up to [6,640 million liters of water](#) over 10 years. This is equivalent to the daily water consumption of a population of 51,000 people<sup>7</sup>. This water abstraction reportedly caused environmental damage worth more than [six million euros](#) in the infamously water-scarce Andalucía. Reportedly, the Guardia Civil's Nature Protection Service (Seprona) delivered a report that highlights [potential "irreversible" damages](#) which affect the nearby [national park Doñana](#), with "significant adverse effects" on certain habitats and species. At the time of writing, the case is still under investigation. According to [elDiario.es](#), the manager of the land acknowledges that these water extractions did not have a license. They however deny that they caused serious environmental damage and claim to have abstracted much less water than the amount estimated as found in the Guardia Civil's report, of which they question the integrity.

<sup>7</sup> Own calculation based on the average water consumption per day in Spain, published as part of the [2024 Statistics and Water Supply and Sanitation](#).



Denmark



Legal  
recipient's  
entity name:

**Ny Endrupholm Invest ApS**

Amount of CAP subsidies in 2024 :



**636,151**

of which €602,627 received in the form of direct payments

**#12**

**in top 100 recipients of direct payment in Denmark**

Ny Endrupholm A/S is a subsidiary that is [100% owned](#) by a higher-level holding company called MSF Group ApS - owned by the Martin Lund Madsen and his son, Frederik Hessel Madsen. They are behind the [country's largest slaughter pig production](#) (103,670 pens). In late 2022, Lund Madsen expanded by [purchasing 25 farm properties](#) (874 hectares total) from a bankrupt competitor for 153 million DKK (€20,483,162). This solidified his status as a [hog baron](#) in Jutland. He now produces well over [250,000 slaughter pigs per year](#), supplying major processors. According to Agriwatch, which interviewed the farmer in connection with the acquisition, he will increase the company's total pig production from approximately 272,000 pigs annually to [400,000](#). While profit and revenue from Ny Endrupholm A/S are unknown, [MSF Group ApS reported](#) a recent annual turnover (revenue) of approximately [511 million DKK](#) (€68,4 million) and a profit of 24 million DKK (€3,2 million).

Ny Endrupholm A/S is notorious for violating [the Animal Welfare Act](#) and has been fined eight times between 2013 and 2023. In the latest case, the Court found that pigs had been beaten with a hammer and described the act as a 'gross indefensible treatment of the animals'. In October 2025, Ny Endrupholm A/S has been [fined for mistreating pigs](#).





Italy



Legal  
recipient's  
entity name:

**BF Agricola srl**  
**Società Agricola**  
**Società per la Bonifica**  
**dei Terreni Ferraresi**  
**(subsidiaries of "BF Group")**



**3,403,531**

of which €1,004,599  
received in the form  
of direct payments

**#2**

in top 100 recipients  
of direct payment  
in Italy

**#80**

BF Agricola S.r.l. Società Agricola carries out the [BF group's main agricultural production activities](#), following the transfer [in 2021 of Bonifiche Ferraresi's](#) core farming and livestock operations.

Bonifiche Ferraresi [is Italy's largest farmland owner, controlling about 7,750 hectares](#) across [Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany and Sardinia](#). Listed on the [Milan stock exchange](#), the group integrates production "[from genome to shelf](#)," [focusing mainly](#) on grain cereals, forage crops, oilseeds, rice, and fruit and vegetable production, while its CAI division [generates most revenues](#) from fuels, fertilisers and cereal trading. Among its stakeholders are [the fossil-fuel giant ENI, Ismea, Intesa Sanpaolo, Fondazione Cariplo, and other institutional investors](#), while the state backed CDP Equity held a stake until [its full divestment in 2022](#). It also partners with industrial groups such as [Leonardo](#) and [ENI](#) on R&D and bio-energy projects.

Through its controlling stake in Consorzi Agrari d'Italia (CAI), Bonifiche Ferraresi [extends its influence](#) beyond production into the national distribution of agricultural products. The Italian Competition and Market Authority [formally reviewed the BF-CAI transaction](#) as a concentration of market power in 2024, deciding not to open a full investigation. Nonetheless, the press has continued to [raise concerns](#) that smaller players in the agri-sector may be sidelined.

The group's influence extends beyond Italy and Europe, with officially announced projects in [Egypt](#) and [Kazakhstan](#) and reported initiatives linked to the Piano Mattei plan in [Algeria](#) and [Ghana](#), as well as proposals for [the reconstruction of Gaza](#).



Germany



Legal  
recipient's  
entity name:

**LIRS Agrar-und**  
**Dienstleistungs GmbH**



**431,469**

of which €1,004,599  
received in the form  
of direct payments

**N/A**

Not in the top 100 recipients of  
direct payments in Germany

The Lürssen Group is a German shipbuilding company known for building custom luxury yachts, naval vessels, and special-purpose ships. The Lürssen Group has two divisions: [Naval Vessels Lürssen \(NVL\)](#) and [Lürssen yachts](#). [NVL](#) is a privately owned group of shipyards in Northern Germany that also manufactures naval vessels and coastguard vessels.

Lürssen is reportedly responsible for building some of the most famous super yachts, such as: Azzam - the world's longest (180m) private superyachts sold to the member of Abu Dhabi royal family, priced at \$600 million or the Dilbar - built for a Russian oligarch, and priced at \$800 million. It was [reported](#) that the company generates as much as €2 billion a year in revenue.

Reportedly the company also owns [1,970 hectares of arable land and 60 hectares of organic cultivation](#) in East Germany.



Italy



Legal  
recipient's  
entity name:

**Genagricola S.p.A.**  
**(also "Genagricola 1851")**



**2,601,361**

of which €845,575  
received in the form  
of direct payments

**#1**

in top 100 recipients  
of direct payment  
in Italy

Genagricola, [Italy's largest agricultural company](#), belongs to [Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A.](#), one of the world's biggest financial groups. Created in 1974 to manage Generali's rural assets, today [it operates under Leone Alato S.p.A.](#), the group's agri-food holding. Genagricola controls [more than 12,000 hectares of cultivated land in Italy and Romania](#),

producing arable crops, wine and livestock. It has diversified further through subsidiaries such as [Sementi Dom Dotto S.p.A.](#), which manufactures seeds, fertilisers and pet food.

In the Po Valley, one of its farms operates an intensive pig facility housing about [4,350 animals and fertilising 150 hectares with slurry](#), releasing over 35 tonnes of ammonia each year [as reported in 2022](#). These emissions [contribute](#) to fine particulate pollution, harmful to human health under prolonged exposure. Beyond Italy, the group owns around [5,000 hectares of farmland](#) and [1,770 hectares of forest](#) in Romania. Research identifies these acquisitions as part of a broader trend of [large-scale farmland concentration by Western European companies](#) after EU enlargement. According to a 2015 European Parliament study these operations in Romania [generated only 62 jobs in 2013](#), while [farmland prices rose from €100 to €3,000–5,000 per hectare](#), displacing local farmers. Meanwhile, Genagricola Romania S.R.L. [received in 2024 a total of €1,035,617 in CAP subsidies, €787,505 of which were in the form of direct payments](#).

[Genagricola highlights sustainability amongst its priorities, such as precision farming and renewable energy](#), but its public reporting does not indicate how much of its land follows verified sustainable practices.



Czechia

Legal  
recipient's  
entity name:

**AGRO Jevišovice, a.s.**  
**Oseva Agri Chrudim, a.s.**  
**ZEMOS a.s.**  
**Poděbradská blata, a.s.**  
**KLADRUBSKÁ a.s.**  
**ALIMEX NEZVĚSTICE a.s.**  
**ZEM, a.s.**  
**Zemědělská společnost**  
**Bílšany s.r.o.**

**ZEAS Puclice a.s.**  
**AGD Kačice, s.r.o.**  
**AGROPARKL spol. s r.o.**  
**ZEOS Brnířov a.s.**  
**DZV NOVA, a.s.**  
**AGS AGRO České**  
**Budějovice a.s.**  
**CIZ - AGRO, a.s.**  
**ANIMO Žatec, a.s.**  
**LIPRA PORK, a.s.**  
**ZS Vilemov, a.s.**

(subsidiaries of "AGRO-  
FERT Group")

Amount of CAP subsidies in 2024:

16,567,592<sup>8</sup>

#8

#13

#16

#19

#42

#68

#27

#30

#32

#35

#46

#90

in top 100 recipients of direct payment  
in Czechia - €3,741,716 received

#61 První zemědělská Záhornice, a.s. and #76 ZAS Podchotuč, a.s. are subsidiaries of Agrofert featuring among the the top100 beneficiaries of direct payments (€ 473,391 received) however, they do not appear among the top1% of CAP beneficiaries, thus they are not accounted for in the above mentioned calculations.

AGROFERT a.s. operates across several key sectors, including the chemical industry, agriculture, and food production. In addition, the Group owns forestry companies and is also active in land technology, logistics, and transportation.


8. AGROPARKL spol. s r.o., ZEOS Brnířov a.s., AGS AGRO České Budějovice a.s., CIZ - AGRO, a.s., ANIMO Žatec, a.s. and LIPRA PORK, a.s. rank within the top1% of CAP beneficiaries thus they are included in this calculation, but they are not among the top100 beneficiaries of direct payments in Czechia

According to the Group's official website, AGROFERT encompasses 66 agricultural companies in Czechia, 19 in Slovakia, 6 in Hungary, 1 in Poland, and 1 in Germany. In 2024, the Group managed approximately [158,000 hectares](#) of agricultural land. Based on its annual report, the entire Group received operating subsidies totaling nearly [EUR 68.7 million](#) in 2024. The majority of these subsidies were linked to primary agricultural production.

In recent years, AGROFERT has faced several regulatory and ethical controversies, including a record [€21 million fine](#) by the Slovak Anti-monopoly Office for unauthorized mergers. After an attempted appeal by the company, [rejected in 2024](#), the fine was eventually paid by AGROFERT. Repeated [findings](#) by the [European Commission](#) and Czech courts (see below) identified a series of conflicts of interest involving its founder, Prime Minister Andrej Babiš. In its 2014-2020 [audit report](#) on the functioning of the management and control systems put in place to avoid conflict of interests, the Commission concluded that there were "serious deficiencies in the design and functioning" of such systems. On multiple occasions ([2018](#), [2019](#) and [2020](#)) Members of the European Parliament adopted [resolutions raising concerns](#) about the misuse of EU agricultural funds in Czechia and Babiš's possible involvement. These cases have reinforced concerns about AGROFERT's political ties and market dominance, which could result in distorting fair competition and undermining transparency in public governance.

Based on conflict-of-interest rulings by the [Municipal Court in Prague](#), confirmed by the [Supreme Administrative Court](#), the Ministry of Agriculture has begun the process of recovering part of the subsidies obtained by AGROFERT for the years 2017-2021. The total amount is [€208 million](#), of which €174 million are area-based subsidies and €34 million are national subsidies.

Appointed Czech Republic's Prime Minister on 9 December 2025, Andrej Babiš, following a specific request by Czech President Petr Pavel, [announced](#) his intention to abandon the control of Agrofert. [Reportedly](#) Agrofert should be transferred to an independent blind trust, managed by an independent trustee and controlled by an independent protector. Babiš [allegedly](#) promised that the company will not return to him even after leaving politics and will be passed to his children only after his death. At the time of writing it is not clear what kind of trust will be set up, nor whether the new legal structure could really address the conflict of interests concerns raised by many in the Czech Republic and at EU level.



Czechia

Legal  
recipient's  
entity name:

**DZS Struhařov a.s.**  
**Mydlářka a.s.**  
**RABBIT Chotýšany a.s.**  
**RABBIT Trhový Štěpánov a.s.**

**VEMA, akciová**  
**společnost**  
**ZD Trhový Štěpánov a.s.**  
**ZES Křivsoudov s.r.o.**

(subsidiaries of "RABBIT  
CZ a.s.")

Amount of CAP subsidies in 2024:



8,380,489

DZS Struhařov a.s. is

#28

in top 100 recipients of direct payment in Czechia  
(€317.355 received).

Mydlářka a.s., RABBIT Chotýšany a.s., RABBIT Trhový Štěpánov a.s., VEMA, akciová společnost, ZD Trhový Štěpánov a.s. and ZES Křivsoudov s.r.o. are not among the top100 recipients of direct payments. However, they appear among the top1% of CAP beneficiaries, thus they are accounted for in the above overall CAP subsidies calculation.

RABBIT CZ a.s. is an agricultural-food conglomerate, [majority-owned by Zdeněk Jandejsek \(holding 45 %\) and Pavel Navrátil \(holding 44 %\)](#). [The holding operates on a total of 15,500 hectares. Within the RABBIT CZ a.s. group, recent annual turnover reached CZK 6.94 billion, with consolidated revenues around CZK 4.5 billion.](#) The group is the second largest producer and processor of meat in Czechia.

In 2025 the Czech Antitrust Office fined ZD Trhový Štěpánov a.s. €42,760 for [violations under the Act on Significant Market Power \(VTS\) and unfair trade practices](#). In October 2025 the Antitrust Office also imposed a fine of €106,890 on Dрупork Svitavy, a.s., a pork production company belonging to the Rabbit group, for [abusing significant market power](#).

According to reports, in 2019 [the State Veterinary Administration found the company in violation of the Animal Protection Act](#) for inappropriate animal cruelty practices on rabbits intended for slaughter, as animals at the RABBIT CZ slaughterhouse were not sufficiently stunned and remained conscious before being killed. The same reports state that the State Veterinary Administration found that the slaughterhouse [employed unqualified personnel and used inappropriate stunning procedures](#). The company RABBIT CZ a.s. operates the only specialised rabbit slaughterhouse in Czechia and is simultaneously the only producer of rabbit meat in the country. According to the company's website, its annual production is 350,000 fattened rabbits.



# CONCLUSION

The CAP was meant to support farmers, but in reality it has become a system that funnels billions of taxpayer money into the hands of wealthy landowners and large industrial agribusinesses. This brief has not only shown that the distribution of CAP payments is highly concentrated in the hands of a small share of recipients who capture the lion's share of EU funds, but also that public money is pocketed by some of the wealthiest and most influential actors within and outside of the EU farming sector, mainly because they own large amounts of land. All the while, small and medium-sized farmers, and those that farm in alignment with nature, continue to struggle within an unjust system that fails to reward their social and environmental contributions.

At the heart of the problem is a deeply flawed design of the CAP with untargeted area-based payments at its heart, distributing public money on the basis of the amount of land owned, rather than on the societal and environmental value that the farming practices concretely adopted deliver. Such distorted distribution undermines the policy's social legitimacy. It also fuels inequality in rural areas, contributes to industrialisation of the farming sector and destruction of nature and climate, undermining resilience and long term viability of food production itself.

To redress the deep injustice at heart of the current subsidy system and regain its legitimacy in the eyes of the public and farmers, the next CAP must be fundamentally reoriented. It must **ensure that support reaches those who truly need it: farmers in precarious economic situations, those that farm in line with nature and those who want to transition to more sustainable practices.**

## MORE SPECIFICALLY, THE NEW CAP SHOULD:

1

**Phase out untargeted hectare-based direct payments over the coming two CAP programming periods**, to provide farmers with the necessary time to plan the transition of their business;

2

Link payments to real farm needs and structures, **prioritising income support for farms with the highest environmental and social value;**

3

**Set a degressive payments system** - with subsidies decreasing the larger the size of a beneficiary's farmland becomes - **and maximum limits to CAP subsidies** that a single entrepreneur or company can get, in line with the average farm income or size in each Member State;

4

**Earmark a substantial part of the CAP budget to support environmental and climate action** - starting from the current 32% to reach at least 50% by the end of the current CAP programming period;

## APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY

This analysis was conducted by data analysts Kaas & Mulvad. The data on beneficiaries in 2024 has been sourced from the countries' respective national [databases on EU agricultural support](#).

The information on subsidies is based on the EU financial year 2024, which runs from 16 October 2023 to 15 October 2024. Unless otherwise specified, this analysis covers the total amount of CAP subsidies, comprising both EU agricultural subsidies and national agricultural co-financing across all six countries for the financial year 2024. The database is updated each year at the end of May.

In some countries' datasets, beneficiaries appear either without receiving support or with a negative amount. This may occur if they previously received agricultural support or are required to repay funds due to an overpayment in the preceding year. Other countries have not included such cases. To ensure uniform calculation, companies listed but not receiving support in a given year are excluded from the percentage calculations. Likewise, companies with a negative total - indicating repayment of earlier subsidies - are also excluded from the calculations for that year.

Publication of EU agricultural support has been mandatory since 2008 and was further clarified under the Common Agricultural Policy 2023–27. From the 2022 financial year, publication requirements were tightened and harmonised. These include the obligation to disclose the name of the recipient (anonymised for payments under €1,250), together with more detailed information

on the type of support and its geographical location. The purpose of publication is to ensure transparency in the use of public funds - enabling scrutiny of who receives support and in what amounts - so that funds are allocated fairly, used responsibly, and misuse is prevented. These requirements are set out in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/128, Articles 58–62, Annex VIII and Annex IX, pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, Articles 98–99.

Member States were required to publish information on recipients of agricultural subsidies for the financial year 16 October 2023 to 15 October 2024 by 31 May 2025. However, several countries have since continued to update or correct their databases. The calculations for the Dutch, Spanish, Italian, French, and German datasets are based on data retrieved in July 2025. It cannot be guaranteed that these datasets have not been updated since.

Data from Denmark was retrieved on 9 September 2025, as its database was temporarily closed due to significant errors, which had to be corrected by the responsible Danish authority. With regard to the data collected from Denmark, it should be noted that the figures provided by the same authorities in Danish krone. To ensure consistency and accuracy, all amounts have instead been extracted in DKK and subsequently converted to EUR using the exchange rate of 7.46 DKK per 1 EUR, corresponding to the rate at the end of the 2024 financial year.

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